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21. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyses a situation where two firms producing differentiated
goods in different countries under Cournot competition bargain over a
horizontal merger and the equity shares of it, that is, over the division of
its combined profit. If there were no post- merger strategic trade policies,
the solution is familiar: Each obtains its initial pre-merger profit (where
optimal pre-merger policy may be taken into consideration)  plus half on the
merger surplus. Introducing post-merger production subsidies/taxes
complicates the solution because policies affect shares and shares affect
policies. Besides the influence of the disagreement points (or inside
options), there are additional effects from differing post-merger policies
caused by asymmetries. To give an example, if the only asymmetry is in
post-merger synergy advantages, with no policies both negotiators divide
the merger profit. In the presence of policies, the owners of the firm
deriving more synergy advantages obtain a larger share of the merged
enterprise. In general, the endogeneity yields intuitively appealing solutions.
The more a procuder contributes to the merger profit, the larger is his/her
share of it.
Besides, with policies mergers may become unfeasible because optimal
policies reverse from pre-merger subsidies to post-merger taxes in most
cases. To put this in a context,  the well-known result in Brander and
Spencer (1985)  is that in a Cournot  duopoly with national firms in different
countries production subsidy is an optimal policy when considering one
country or both countries. This was subsequently modified in several ways.
Eaton and Grossman (1986) showed that in a Bertrand-duopoly production
tax is optimal in both countries if all production is exported to a third
country. Dixit (1984) showed that if there are several Cournot-competitive
firms in the policy country tax may well be optimal because a subsidy to one
domestic firm is, in itself, harmful to other domestic firms. In all of these,
the firms were owned by nationals. A modification concerns cross-ownership
of the imperfectly competitive firms. Lee (1990) and Dick (1993) showed
that if these firms are partially owned by foreigners subsidy
recommendation may reverse to tax because a part of the benefit caused
by a subsidy goes to foreigners. In their papers, the firms continue to make
independent production decisions from which ownership is separated and the
cross- ownership shares are modelled as exogenous. A further extension
concerns subsidizing/taxing research and development (R&D) instead of
final goods. As shown by Brander and Spencer (1983), subsidizing is still
optimal. However, as presented by Qiu and Tao (1998), if there are
3considerable exogenous spillovers from the R&D activity to foreign firms,
subsidy recommendation may be reversed. Zhou et al. (2001) discuss
investment taxes and subsidies in a duopoly situation of a low product
quality country (firm) and a high quality country (firm), both exporting to a
third country. They found out that under Cournot competition tax is optimal
in the low- quality country while subsidy is optimal in the high- quality
country. Joint welfare is increased by taxes in both countries.
Section 2 presents the basic model and derives optimal policies. Section 3
analyses the merger game which is formulated as a Nash bargaining game
which may be seen as a limiting case of a game of alternating offers (see
Binmore et al. (1986)). Firms' owners know what the goverments' (optimal)
policies would be after merger while a government knows the effects of its
policy on production and prices. Asymmetries in country sizes, production
costs and synergy advantages are discussed in Section 4. In Sections 2-4
the policies are determined non- cooperatively. However, as will be shown in
Section 5, joint welfare would be increased by subsidies in both countries.
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
2.THE MODEL
There are two countries, denoted by the letters h (h-country) and f (f-
country). Each country has similar endowments of a single factor of
production. This factor is used in two production sectors in both countries.
The first is a competitive sector, denoted by subscript 0, where a
homogenous good is produced in both countries. The second sector is
imperfectly competitive, producing two symmetric, differentiated goods,
good 1 in h-country and good 2 in f- country. In the production of these
goods, marginal costs are constant, denoted by c1 for good 1 and c2 for
good 2. The governments' policy instruments are production tax or subsidy,
denoted by s1 for a per unit subsidy in h- country if s1 > 0 and tax if s1 < 0.
The corresponding denotation for f-country is s2. There are no trading
costs and the markets are integrated. Arbitrage ensures that the
government must subsidize or tax all domestic production of a good instead
of exports (or domestic consumption) only.
4A representative consumer in either country has a quasilinear utility
function U(q0,q1,q2) = u(q1,q2) + q0 where qi denotes consumption of the
respective good. As in Dixit (1988), the subutility function has a quadratic
form u(q1,q2)=  A.(q1+ q2) - (1/2)(q12+q22+2ßq1q2). When maximising this
with the budget constraint, we arrive at inverted demands:
                         pi     =   A  -  qi - ßqj                 (1)
where i,j =1,2, i≠ j, refer to goods and pi are the respective prices. It is
assumed that 0 < ß < 1, that is, the goods are imperfect substitutes.
In the initial situation of national firms, in h- country firm 1,  which is owned
by h-country residents, produces good 1 and in f-country firm 2 owned by f-
country residents produces good 2. As can be shown, it is optimal for both
governments to pay subsidies. These are equal in a symmetric situation
(equal unit costs and equal country sizes). If h-country is larger than f-
country, optimal subsidy is larger because of a larger consumer surplus.
This leads to a larger profit of firm 1. As was shown by Neary (1994) for
homogenous goods and as could be shown for heterogenous goods, if the
unit cost of firm 1 is smaller than that of firm 2, h-country's subsidy is
larger and, naturally, the profit of firm 1.
Let us now turn to a situation where firms 1 and 2 merge. Good 1 is still
produced in h-country only in plant 1 of the merged enterprise and good 2 in
f-country only in plant 2. The inflexibility of production sites may be
justified, e.g., by assuming sunk costs. The merger situation is formulated
as a joint maximization of the combined profit where (potential) synergy
advantages are taken into account:
max (π1+ π2)   =  (A-q1-ßq2+s1-c1+a1)q1 + (A-q2-ßq1+s2-c2+a2)q2 + S   (2)
 q1,q2
where S denotes such synergy advantages which do not depend on
production quantities. If they do, I formulate these advantages as constant
unit cost savings, denoted by ai . I will call the former fixed and the latter
variable advantages. (For modelling horizontal mergers, see Farrell and
Shapiro (1990)). The plants use separate accounting so that the
government may tax or subsidize the production of the domestic plants. The
first order conditions combined with Eq. (1) are:
      pi   =    A  -  qi   - ßqj        =   qi + ßqj - si + ci - ai    (3)
5From Eq. (3) the Nash- Cournot equilibrium quantities are:
      qi =  [A (2-2ß) -2(ci-ai)+ 2ß(cj-aj) + 2si - 2ßsj ] / DM             (4)
where DM = 4-4ß2. Let z denote the share of the merged enterprise and of
its profit going to h-country residents. The governments take z as
exogenous. As explained by Markusen and Venables (1988), optimal
subsidy/tax for h- country, s1*, is obtained by maximizing the indirect utility
function vh(p1,p2, z(π1+π2)-s1q1) with respect to s1. This yields1)
         s1* = -2(1-z - Ω/2)(1-ß2)q1     (5a)
where Ω describes the relative size of h-country, 0 < Ω < 1.
Correspondingly, optimal policy in f-country is
          s2* = -2(z - ø/2)(1-ß2)q2     (5b)
where ø = 1-Ω is the relative size of f-country. Based on these, it can be
shown that in the merger case, irrespective of division of equities, tax is
optimal at least in one of the two countries2). For a wide range of cases it is
optimal in both countries, for example, if all production is exported to a
third country or if 1/4 < z < 3/4 with equal country sizes. A part of this is
explainable by the arguments in cross-ownership literature since owning the
shares of the merged enterprise resembles cross- ownership of the two
national firms. A tax in the domestic country hurts the domestic plant but a
part of this loss goes abroad while at the same time it benefits the foreign
plant and a part of this benefit comes back to the domestic country.
However, the tax recommendation is stronger here because a subsidy in one
country would lead to an extra large increase in the production of the
subsidized good as noted above. This increases subsidy costs and implies an
excessively low price for this good making subsidization less lucrative.
The connection between subsidies/taxes and the ownership shares is central
to the following analysis. Differentiating Eq.(5a) implicitly with respect to s1,
Eq.(5b) with respect to s2, using Eq. (4) and applying the derivation rule for
inverse functions yields
   ∂s1*/∂z = 2(1-ß2)q1/ [1+ (1-z - Ω/2)] = - ∂s1*/∂(1-z)      > 0   (6a)
6   ∂s2*/∂z  = - 2(1-ß2)q2/ [1+ z - ø/2)]   = - ∂s2*/∂(1-z)    <  0    (6b)
That is, an increase in domestic ownership of the merged enterprise leads
to an increase (a decrease) in optimal subsidy (tax) of the domestic good.
3. THE MERGER GAME
The merger is bargained between the native owners of the two national
firms. The variables in the national firms' case are denoted by the letters N
and in the merger case by M. The bargaining concerns the division of the
combined profit of the plants π1M + π2M , denoted by π12M. The
governments know how the firms react and, in addition, the owners know
what the governments will do, that is, implement optimal policy.
Consequently, we may write  π12M  = π12M (s1*M,s2*M). For simplicity, we
assume that the marginal utility of income is equal to unity in both
countries. As could be shown, this does not affect the conclusions. Note
that this assumption is implicitly included when we were discussing optimal
policies. The bargaining solution is obtained by maximizing the following Nash
product with respect to ownership shares
               max   [zπ12M - π1N)][(1-z)π12M - π2N]        (7)
                  z
with the usual feasibility requirements. The first order condition may be
written as :
             ∂(zπ12M)/∂z
___________________________   =
            zπ12M  - π1N
                                                                                             (8a)
         ∂[(1-z)π12M ]/∂(1-z)
________________________________________
         (1-z)π12M - π2N
where , from Eqs.(4), (6a) and (6b),
7∂(zπ12M)/∂z = π12M                                                               (8b)
                +  2z(q1M)2(1-ß2)/ [1+ (1-z - Ω/2)]-  2z(q2M)2(1-ß2)/ [1+ z - ø/2)]
∂[(1-z)π12M]/∂(1-z)  =  π12M                                                                   (8c)
      - 2(1- z)(q1M)2(1-ß2)/[1+ (1-z - Ω/2)] + 2(1-z)(q2M)2(1-ß2)/[1+z -  ø/2)]
At least for ß ≥ 1/2, (8b) and (8c) are both positive3). Note that relative
production quantities unambiguously reflect the relative plant- specific
profits, for example if q1M > q2M from  Eq. (3) π1M = (q1M+ßq2M)q1M >
(q2M+ßq1M)q2M = π2M.  Eqs.(8a)-(8c) show the following:
Proposition. With strategic trade policies, the division of the equities of the
merged enterprise depends (i) on the initial national firms' situation and (ii)
on how much these national firms may contribute to the profit of the
merged enterprise.
(i) is a standard effect of the disagreement point or inside option, described
in the denominators of Eq. (8a), while the endogeneity of the merger comes
entirely from (ii). This can be seen by considering a situation where no trade
policies are available. In this situation, the numerators of Eq. (8a) are the
same, equal to π12M, and we obtain the well-known and widely applied split-
the-difference solution (see, e.g., Holmström and Roberts (1998)). The
residents of a country obtain the profit of the respective national firm plus
half of the difference between the merger profit and the profits of both
national firms, that is, from Eqs. (8a)- (8c),
zπ12M = π1N + (1/2)(π12M - π1N - π2N) and
 (1-z)π12M = π2N + (1/2)(π12M - π1N - π2N) .
In a situation with policies, the solution becomes more complicated because
of the endogeneity in Eqs. (8b) and (8c). The general case is presented in
Figure 1 where, applying Osborne and Rubinstein (1990),  the left-hand side
of Eq. (8a) concerning firm/plant 1 in h-country and right-hand side
concerning firm/plant 2 in f-country are drawn separately as functions of z.
I will call the former the h-curve and the latter the f-curve. A sufficient (but
by no means necessary) condition for h-curve to be decreasing is to assume
that ∂2(zπ12M)/∂z2 < 0, that is, the profit amount is not increasingly
increasing with respect to profit share.  Correspondingly, f-curve increases
8with respect to z. The equilibrium is where these curves cross.
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Figure 1. Eq. (8a) presented geometrically. Solid lines depict the perfectly
symmetric case. Broken lines depict three situations:
(i) h-country's unit cost is smaller than f-country's cost
(ii) h-country is larger than f-country
(iii) h-country plant derives more synergies than f-country plant
The solid lines depict the symmetric situation, that is, country sizes, unit
production costs and synergy advantages are equal. The unique solution is z
= (1-z) = 1/2 because in the merger situation the plant-specific profits and
production quantities are equal, as they are in the national firms' case.
Accordingly, in this equilibrium the necessary condition for the feasibility of
the merger is that half of the profit of the merged enterprise is larger than
the disagreement profit, that is, (1/2)πM12 - πiN > 0. This may be
problematic if the governments pay the national firms optimal subsidies and
if the bargaining owners suppose that the goverments will levy optimal
noncooperative production taxes after the merger. As an illustration, Table
1a shows the profits in a symmetric case without any synergies for a
sample of values of substitution. As may be inferred, there will be no
9merger unless there are sufficient synergy advantages. Note, however, that
optimal policies may also prevent mergers with synergy advantages, if these
are not large enough. In Table 1b corresponding figures are presented in a
situation where all production is exported to a third country. As we can see,
purely anticompetitive mergers are possible only if the substitutability is
very high.
                                  πiN(si*)                   π12M/ 2
ß = 0.5                   (A-c)2/3.28               (A-c)2/7.6
ß = 0.8                   (A-c)2/3.80               (A-c)2/7.94
ß = 0.9                   (A-c)2/3.90               (A-c)2/7.98
ß=0.999                  (A-c)2/4                   (A-c)2/ 8
Table 1a. Perfectly symmetric two-countries situation. First column: the
profit of a national firm with optimal subsidies. Second column: the merger
profit going to each country with optimal taxes and no synergy advantages.
                        πiN(si*)                           π12M/ 2
ß = 0.9           (A-c)2/10.05          (A-c)2/10.155
ß=0.999         (A-c)2/10.56         (A-c)2/10.125
Table 1b. Perfectly symmetric situation when all production is exported to a
third country. First colum: the profit of a national firm if there are optimal
subsidies. Second colum: the merger profit going to each country with
optimal taxes and no synergy advantages.
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4. ASYMMETRIES IN COSTS, SYNERGIES AND COUNTRY SIZES
Three asymmetries are discussed in the following. Each of them is analysed
separately while assuming the others absent. Let us first consider a
situation where the unit production costs in different countries are not
similar. Assume that h-country's cost c1 is smaller than f-country's cost c2.
Consider a hypothetical situation where the production cost is (c1 + c2)/2 in
both countries corresponding to the solid curves in Figure 1. Let h-country's
cost decrease and f-country's cost increase from this average. Intuitively,
one might suggest that h-country residents obtain a larger share for the
two reasons discussed in Section 3. (i) Their disagreement point is higher.
This is obvious.  (ii) Their more cost-effective firm would contribute more to
the merger profit. This is not so self-evident because a cost difference
causes changes in taxes. For any given z,  by inserting s1* and s2* from
Eqs.(5a) and (5b) into Eq.(4), differentiating with respect to c1 and doing
the same with respect to c2 we arrive at:
           ∂q1M*/∂c1 , ∂q2M*/∂c2 < 0 and ∂q2M*/∂c1 , ∂q1M*/∂c2  > 0  (9)
Because of this, the terms 2z(q1M)2(1-ß2)/ [1+ (1-z - Ω/2)]  and
-2z(q2M)2(1-ß2)/ (1+ z - ø/2) in h-curve increase which contributes to its
upwards shift. Corresponding terms contribute to f-curve's downward shift.
What remains is the merger profit π12M, which  is present both in the
denominator and numerator of both curves. Additionally, its change is the
result of two opposing forces. For these reasons, we may suppose that its
change does not affect the curves very much compared with the two other
elements mentioned above. Furthermore, in the national firms' situation the
disagreement point, that is, the profit of h-country firm, π1N, is larger than
that of f-country firm, π2N, which as itself leads to a decrease in the
denominator of h-curve and increase in that of f-curve. Accordingly, h-curve
shifts upwards, f-curve shifts downwards, as shown in Figure 1,  and h-
country's merger share z increases. The only conceivable situation for a
reverse result would be such where the cost advantage is taxed away post-
merger.  However, even if the lower cost country would tax its production
more than the higher cost country, the tax difference must be smaller than
the cost difference. This can be seen by subtracting in Eq. (4), which yields,
when taking Eq. (9) into account,
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        q1M* - q2M* = [(2-2ß)(c2 - c1) + (2-2ß)(s1M* - s2M*)]/DM > 0        (10)
In conclusion, if unit production costs differ, the owners of the lower cost
firm obtain a larger share of the merged enterprise both because of the
higher inside option and because they contribute more to the merger profit.
In the case of dissimilar country sizes, let the relative size of h-country be
larger than that of f-country. Consider a hypothetical situation where
relative country sizes are equal, corresponding to the solid curves in Figure
1.  Let h- country size Ω grow and f- country size 1-Ω fall from this
average. For any given z, inserting optimal policies s1* and s2* from
Eqs.(5a)-(5b) into Eq.(4) and differentiating with respect to Ω we arrive at:
      ∂q1M*/∂Ω, ∂q2M*/∂(1-Ω)  ≥  0  and  ∂q2M*/∂Ω, ∂q1M*/∂(1-Ω) ≤  0 (11)
In Eq. (11) the equality signs refer to a case where all production is
exported to a third country. Otherwise, an increase in h-country's relative
size leads to a larger output of its good and to a smaller output of f-
country's good. The reason is that the post-merger tax in h-country
becomes smaller than in f-country, as may be seen by subtracting in Eq. (4):
          q1M* - q2M* = (2-2ß)(s1M* - s2M*)/DM            (12)
The explanation is that in a larger country the consumer surplus items are
larger and a smaller tax on one good lowers the prices of both goods. In Eqs.
(8a)-(8c) in the numerator of h-curve a higher Ω leads to a larger term
2z(q1M)2(1-ß2)/ [1+ (1-z - Ω/2)]  and a lower 1-Ω  to a larger term
-2z(q2M)2(1-ß2)/ (1+ z - (1-Ω)/2) for any given z. In addition, the profit of
the national firm in the larger country is higher because of a higher subsidy,
that is, π1N > π2N. This decreases the value of the denominator of h-curve.
All these factors contribute to an upwards shift of h-curve.  By similar
arguments, corresponding terms in the f-curve contribute to its shift
downwards. Again,  what remains is the term π12M. As before, we may
suppose that the effect of the two opposite changes on the merger profit
are relatively small. Accordingly, h-curve shifts upwards and f-curve
downwards, as shown in Figure 1. In conclusion, the owners in the larger
country obtain a larger share both because of a higher pre-merger subsidy
and because of a lower post-merger tax.
Note that even if I have been speaking about taxes when analysing
asymmetries in the merger case, a subsidy is possible in the lower cost
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country and/or in the larger country. Finally, note that both asymmetries
affect the feasibility conditions of the merger game. If h- country has a
lower production cost or is relatively larger than f- country, in the feasibility
condition  zπ12M > π1N  both sides increase while in the condition (1-z)π12M
> π2N  both sides decrease as compared with a perfectly symmetric
situation. More specific forms could be derived but I leave it at this remark.
The third asymmetry concerns the post-merger situation only. Variable
synergy advantages were modelled as unit cost savings. If they are
asymmetric, we may proceed as with asymmetric costs. Eq. (9) becomes
     ∂q1M*/∂a1 , ∂q2M*/∂a2 > 0 and ∂q2M*/∂a1 , ∂q1M*/∂a2  < 0  (13)
Starting from a hypothetical situation of equal synergies and analysing Eqs.
(8a)-(8c), we can infer that if, for example, the production of h-country's
good derives more technological advantages from the merger than the
production of f-country's good, a1 > a2, h-curve shifts upwards and f-curve
downwards. Eq.(4) may be rewritten as
 q1M* - q2M* = [(2-2ß)(a1 - a2) + (2-2ß)(s1M* - s2M*)]/DM          (14)
which shows, when applying Eq. (13), that all the synergy advantage is not
taxed away. In conclusion, h-country owners obtain a larger share for post-
merger reasons only. Similar conclusions apply to asymmetric fixed
advantages. If the term S in Eq.(2) can be divided to two parts, one accruing
to plant 1 only, S1, and the other to plant 2 only, S2, and if S1 > S2, h-curve
shifts upwards and f-curve downwards. It should be emphasized that, in the
absence of policies, the merger profit would be shared equally irrespective
of asymmetric synergies. But now, with policies, those owners whose firm
derives more advantages receive a larger share. The explanation is that the
increase in the share lowers the tax of the good which benefits more from
the merger. For the other group of owners the amount of its income may
well be larger than what it would obtain with a larger share. In other words, a
lower tax on the more benefiting good leads to a so much larger merger
profit that even the owners of the smaller share receive more.
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5. GOVERNMENTS'  COOPERATION
Above, such situations have been discussed where the governments did not
cooperate with each other. Brander and Spencer (1985) showed for
homogenous goods duopoly with national firms that in a cooperative
situation it is optimal to pay lower subsidies than in a non- cooperative
situation. In particular, if both countries export all their production to a
third country optimal policy reverses to tax. As could be shown, this result
also holds for the heteregenous goods duopoly if the goods are relatively
good substitutes.
For the merger case, nearly opposite results ensue. Maximizing joint welfare
with respect to si yields4)
   siM*  = [-qi(∂pi/∂si)- qj(∂pj/∂si)] / [∂qi/∂si] = (1-ß2)qi  ≥ 0          (15)
As can be seen from Eq. (15), if there is no domestic consumption in either
country, laissez faire is optimal. In other situations, joint welfare would be
increased by subsidies in both countries. For the wide range of cases where
tax is optimal in both countries, this directly implies that the outcome is
exactly opposite compared with the national firms' case, that is,
cooperative subsidies are higher than non-cooperative ones. In general, the
same applies to one of the countries at least. Notice that with cooperative
policies, the feasibility conditions of the merger become less demanding.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A very simple duopoly model was applied. Its limitations are obvious, e.g.,
constant costs and quadratic utilities. A further constraining assumption
was that when deciding on optimal policy, a government did not take into
account the effects of its policy on the sharing of the equities of the
merged enterprise. In principle, we could include this into the model but this
would complicate it considerably 5). It may be conjectured that if a
government does this way, it would lead to a lower tax or even a subsidy
because, from a firm's point of view, a decrease in tax is like a decrease in
production cost increasing its share. However, if both governments do this,
the end result may well be that there are no changes in shares but lower
taxes in both countries.
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Finally, let us consider some alternative frameworks discussed in
Introduction. First, as could be shown, if the firm(s) would adjust prices
(Bertrand competition) instead of quantities, for the merger case it can be
shown that similar conclusions would be obtained as for Cournot
competition. Second, if there were more firms in the Cournot- competitive
sector, the policy recommendation tends to reverse, in a national firm's
case, to tax. This, in itself, would make the feasibility condition less
stringent. At the same time, however, the merger game becomes more
complicated (see Horn and Persson (2001)). What can be shown is that, in a
situation of two firms in one country, one firm in the other and a merger of
a domestic and a foreign firm, tax is optimal for a wide range of equity
shares.
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NOTES:
1)From Eq. (4)  ∂qi/∂si = 2/(4-4ß2) and ∂qj/∂si = -2ß/(4-4ß2). From Eq. (3)
∂pi/∂si = ∂qi/∂si+ß∂qj/∂si - 1  = -1/2 and ∂pi/∂sj = 0.  The plant-specific
profits are, from Eq. (3), πi = (qi+ßqj)q1. Differentiating their sum yields
∂(π1+π2)/∂si = qi . The first order condition for maximizing  the indirect
utility function with respect to s1 is ∂vh/ds1 = -q1h(∂p1/∂s1)-q2h(∂p2/∂s1)+
z[∂(π1+π2)/∂s1]-q1-s1(∂q1/∂s1) =0
2)
 Assume that subsidy is optimal policy in h-country, that is, 1 - z -Ω/2 < 0.
From this, 1/2 < z - 1/2 + Ω/2 = z - ø/2, that is, tax is optimal in f-
country Correspondingly, if subsidy is optimal in f-country z - ø/2 = z-
1/2+Ω/2 < 0 from which 1-z - Ω/2  > 1/2, that is, tax is optimal in h-
country. If all production is exported to a third country, the outcome is
obtained by setting Ω = ø = 0 into Eqs. (9a) and (9b).
3)
 If ß ≥ 1/2, the right hand side of Eq. (12b)
 > (q2M)2  -  2z(q2M)2(1-ß2)/ [1+ z - ø/2)]
>  (q2M)2  -  2z(q2M)2(3/4)/ [1+ z - 1/2)]
= (q2M)2[1/2 + z - (3/2)z]/[1/2+ z] >  (q2M)2(1-z)/(1+2z) > 0
4)The condition for joint welfare maximization with respect to si is
∂vh/∂si + ∂vf/∂si = -q i(∂p i/∂si)- qj(∂pj/∂si)+  ∂π12M /∂si -qi- si(∂qi/∂si) = 0
5)  Eq. (5a) would become  s1M = -2(1-z - Ω/2)(1-ß2)q1 +  (∂z/∂s1)π12M  
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